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Market Power as a Threshold Requirement in 
Antitrust Summary Judgments: Assam Drug Co. v. 
Miller Brewing Co. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
cently created a new requirement for plaintiffs under the Sherman Act. 
Plaintiffs must now first prove that a defendant possesses substantial 
market power1 before they will be allowed to proceed with their anti-
trust cases. 2 While this requirement obviously increases the burden 
upon plaintiffs, it also has the potential for making that burden over-
whelming. For example, because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 
requires the plaintiff to have a sufficient factual basis before filing the 
complaint, courts could require plaintiffs to have proof of market power 
before filing a complaint-without the benefit of discovery. The Ninth 
Circuit recently affirmed a case under these circumstances. 3 In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit• has also followed the Eighth Circuit's lead in imposing 
the market power requirement, as has the Seventh Circuit;~ other 
courts may follow as well. 
The first case to impose a preliminary requirement of showing 
substantial market power was an earlier Eighth Circuit case affirming 
the summary judgment of a case brought under South Dakota's anti-
trust statute, Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co. 6 Because of the 
similarity between the South Dakota statute and the Sherman Act,7 the 
court employed the same basic analysis applied to actions brought 
under the federal antitrust laws.8 This similarity allowed the Eighth 
Circuit to extend the market power requirement to federal cases under 
1. Market power is simply the ability of a firm to control the disposition of a product. 
2. Ryko Mfg. v. Eden Servs., 821 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987). 
3. Continental Maritime v. Pacific Coast Metal Trades, 817 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1987); See 
Popofsky & Goodwin, The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 195, 
209-12 (1988). 
4. R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 67,483 
reh'g granted 841 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1988). 
5. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987). 
6. 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986). 
7. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 37-1-3.1 (1977), provides in part: "A contract, combination, 
or conspiracy between two or more persons in restraint of trade or commerce any part of which is 
within this state is unlawful." 
Section One of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), provides in part: "Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 
8. 798 F.2d at 313. 
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the Sherman Act.9 Because the rationale of Assam Drug has been ex-
tended to Sherman Act cases by the Eighth Circuit, with other circuits 
following suit, and because the rationale upsets the traditional balance 
in antitrust litigation by creating a possibly insurmountable burden for 
plaintiffs, the case merits critical examination. 
This casenote begins with a brief review of the applicable antitrust 
law. The note then examines the rationale of the Assam Drug decision 
and concludes that it is flawed because it conflicts with Supreme Court 
precedent. The note argues further that the court has instead imposed 
its own set of political beliefs which turn out to be less than satisfac-
tory. This note concludes that since both the decision and the philoso-
phy it is based on are misguided, the case should not be followed. 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The antitrust laws, and specifically Section One of the Sherman 
Act, are designed to prevent restraint of trade. 10 In fact, read literally, 
they prohibit any restraint of trade. 11 But in reality, all contracts re-
strain or restrict in some way. Not surprisingly, a "judicial gloss" has 
been placed on these prohibitions whereby only unreasonable restraints 
are prohibited.12 
To determine whether restraints are unreasonable, they are first 
classified as either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal restraints are 
agreements among competitors while vertical restraints are agreements 
within the chain of distribution. 13 There are different types of vertical 
restraints as well. Vertical price restraints are things such as minimum 
retail prices imposed upon distributors or retailers by manufacturers. 
Examples of vertical nonprice restraints are restrictions on customers a 
distributor may sell to or areas in which he may sell. 
Once a restraint is classified, its reasonableness is analyzed under 
one of two different standards: the per se rule or the rule of reason. 
Horizontal restraints and vertical price restraints are traditionally gov-
erned by per se rules/4 vertical nonprice restraints are governed by the 
rule of reason. 15 
9. Ryko Mfg. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 121S, 1231 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 
7SI (1988). 
10. IS U.S.C. §I (1982). 
II. Section One of the Sherman Act, IS U.S.C. § I (1982), provides in part: "Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 
12. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 60 (1911 ). 
13. The chain of distribution involves the supplier, distributor and retailer. 
14. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 40S U.S. S96, 608 (1972). 
IS. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
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Per se violations are "certain agreements or practices which be-
cause of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeem-
ing virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have 
-caused or the business excuse for their use."16 Per se rules treat the 
restraint as being illegal without need of any further inquiry. "The per 
se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an antitrust plaintiff 
successfully plays it, he need only tally his score."17 
Rule of reason treatment, on the other hand, rather than making a 
restraint automatically illegal, invites the court to examine a restraint 
in the light of various factors and determine its reasonableness.18 Under 
the rule of reason "the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a 
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as 
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."19 
While the law in this area has changed dramatically over the last 
two decades, changes concerning vertical nonprice restraints have been 
most spectacular. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 20 the United 
States Supreme Court refused to apply a per se rule to a vertical non-
price agreement. Four years later, however, in United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 21 the Court held that vertical nonprice restrictions 
were per se violations of the Sherman Act.22 Nevertheless, this rule was 
overturned ten years later in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 23 in favor of rule of reason analysis for vertical non price agree-
ments.24 This does not mean that vertical nonprice restraints are never 
analyzed under per se rules; as will be seen, per se rules are used in 
some circumstances. 211 GTE Sylvania merely holds that there is a pre-
sumption of rule of reason treatment for vertical nonprice restraints. 26 
Concurrent with all of the activity involving vertical nonprice re-
straints, the role of summary judgment in antitrust has undergone dra-
matic changes as well. Following PolZer v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc., 27 summary judgment of antitrust cases became disfavored. 
Six years later, however, in First National Bank v. Cities Service 
16. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
17. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980). 
18. The rule of reason is discussed in detail in Part III. 
19. 433 U.S. at 49. 
20. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
21. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
22. /d. 
23. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
24. /d. 
25. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
26. /d. 
27. 368 U.S. 464 (1962). 
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Co., 28 the Court made it clear that antitrust cases are not exempt from 
summary judgment. 
While we recognize the importance of preserving litigants' rights to a 
trial on their claims, we are not prepared to extend those rights to the 
point of requiring that anyone who files an antitrust complaint setting 
forth a valid cause of action be entitled to a full-dress trial notwith-
standing the absence of any significant probative evidence tending to 
support the complaint.29 
The Court's newfound approbation of summary judgment in anti-
trust was made clear in 1986 with Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 30 one of three decisions that term encouraging 
the use of the procedure in all types of cases. 31 Nevertheless, Poller, 
which held that summary judgment should be used "sparingly" in anti-
trust has never been overruled and summary judgment is still used con-
servatively in antitrust cases because the issues tend to be complex and 
difficult. 32 
These two controversial areas of antitrust law, treatment of verti-
cal nonprice restraints and summary judgment, converged in Assam 
Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co. 33 There the court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit ruled against the plaintiff in an antitrust case holding 
that a showing of a defendant's market power was a preliminary re-
quirement. Specifically, the court stated that "a defendant who estab-
lishes, in accordance with the rules governing summary judgment, that 
it lacks market power a fortiori establishes that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and is entitled to entry of judgment in its favor as a 
matter of law."34 The court's reasoning was as follows: The alleged 
misconduct involved a vertical nonprice restraint. Such restraints are 
governed by the rule of reason. The rule of reason requires a showing 
of market power. Summary judgment applies to antitrust cases. There-
fore the market power test applies to this antitrust summary judgment 
motion. 
This argument fails in two respects. First, the premise that market 
power is a threshold requirement of the rule of reason is false. Second, 
even if that premise is true, the conclusion that the market power test 
28. 391 U.S. 253 (1968). 
29. /d. at 290. 
30. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
31. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (antitrust); 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (products liability); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (first amendment). 
32. See e.g., Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1584 (11th Cir. 1988). 
33. 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986). 
34. !d. at 317. 
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applies to summary judgments in antitrust cases does not necessarily 
follow from the premises, thus the argument is invalid. 
II. THE Assam Drug CASE 
The plaintiff in this case, Assam Drug Co. (Assam), was a retail 
seller of beer and other alcoholic beverages in South Dakota. Beginning 
in 1976 Assam bought its Miller Brewing Co. (Miller) products 
through a distributor in a different geographical region because that 
distributor offered a lower price and an attractive discounting policy. In 
1983, however, Miller prohibited its distributors from selling outside 
their limited geographical area and Assam was forced to buy from its 
local distributor at higher prices. Assam brought suit in South Dakota 
state court, alleging restraint of trade. Miller removed the case to fed-
eral court and filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by 
an affidavit that its market share was less than 20%. Assam offered 
nothing to counter Miller's depiction of market share.35 Thereupon the 
district court granted Miller's motion for summary judgment and the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The circuit court 
stated that in order to narrow the "unlimited inquiry necessary under 
the rule of reason," it adopted a new requirement "at the threshold that 
the plaintiff attacking a vertical nonprice restraint prove the defendant's 
substantial market power in a relevant market."36 The court concluded 
that a 20% market share did not amount to substantial market power 
and thus summary disposition was appropriate. 37 
The restraint involved in Assam Drug arose out of Miller's impo-
sition of restrictions on its distributors-preventing them from selling to 
any distributors from any other geographic area. It was not a horizon-
tal restraint because there was no agreement between competitors. Nor 
was it a vertical price restraint because there was no specific imposition 
of a retail price. The restriction was a vertical nonprice restraint, 
which, as the court correctly determined, should be analyzed under the 
,..-rule of reason. In its application of the rule of reason, however, the 
Assam Drug court missed the mark. 
III. THE RULE OF REASON 
There are a number of different ideas, both in scholarly literature 
and case law, about rule of reason analysis. Professor Areeda indicates 
that the inquiry is three-pronged: (1) Identify what harm to competi-
35. !d. 
36. !d. at 315-16. 
37. Id. at 313. 
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tion results or may result from the collaborators' activities; (2) Deter-
mine the nature and magnitude of the 'redeeming virtues' of the chal-
lenged collaboration; and (3) Determine whether there are 'less 
restrictive alternatives' to the challenged restraint. 38 
According to Professor Sullivan, there are five steps in a rule of 
reason analysis: (1) Identify the specific practice; (2) Determine the 
purpose of the restraint; (3) Identify the likely effects of the practice; 
( 4) Consider how the challenged practice will affect competitive inter-
action in the industry; and (5) Determine whether, on balance, the re-
striction substantially impedes competition. 39 
Judge Posner and Judge Bork, on the other hand, argue that all 
vertical restrictions should be legal per se and suggest complete elimi-
nation of the rule. 40 Short of such a drastic alternative, they invite 
courts to meet them at an intermediate position. At this middle ground 
between per se legality and traditional rule of reason analysis, they 
urge courts to take "shortcuts" such as making a plaintiff first show 
that a "defendant has market power (that is, power to raise prices sig-
nificantly above the competitive level without losing all of one's busi-
ness)."41 They recommend this approach for two reasons: First, be-
cause traditional rule of reason analysis is long and complex, any 
shortcut to avoid that arduous process will be welcome. Second, the 
shortcut is justified because if a firm does not have market power, it 
cannot control the market and therefore cannot affect competition. The 
requirement of a threshold showing of market power is the distinctive 
feature of the Posner-Bork approach, in contrast to the broad-based 
approaches advocated by Areeda and Sullivan. 
An examination of Supreme Court case law reveals that the 
Court's approach is more similar to the Areeda and Sullivan ap-
proaches than the Posner-Bark approach. The classic statement of the 
rule of reason was made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of 
Trade v. United States: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as 
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To 
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
38. P. AREEDA, THE "Ruu: OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 2 
(1981). 
39. L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 187-88 (1977). 
40. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 25 (1981); Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 
SuP. CT. REv. 171, 190-92. 
41. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742,745 (7th Cir. 1982)(Pos-
ner, J.). 
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peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint 
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 42 
171 
More recently, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,'u 
the Court characterized the rule of reason this way: "Under this rule, 
the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding 
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an un-
reasonable restraint on competition. "44 
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States/ 5 
the Court held that "competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyz-
ing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and 
the reasons why it was imposed."46 
All of these cases indicate that rule of reason analysis entails the 
examination of a multitude of factors. Nowhere is market power sin-
gled out as a threshold requirement of rule of reason analysis. 
Consider the most recent statement by the Court on the subject. 
The Solicitor General correctly observes: "While the reasonableness 
of a particular alleged restraint often depends on the market power of 
the parties involved, because a judgment about market power is the 
means by which the effects of the conduct on the market place can be 
assessed, market power is only one test of 'reasonableness.' "47 
Not only do the Supreme Court cases fail to provide support for 
the threshold showing of market power requirement, another recent 
trend in Supreme Court cases suggests that such a requirement would 
not be approved by the Court. In GTE Sylvania the plaintiff argued 
that the defendant's acts should be treated under a per se analysis 
rather than rule of reason. The Court, however, held that "departure 
from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable eco-
nomic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing."48 
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & 
Printing Co./9 the Court reaffirmed the idea that a showing of market 
power is required for per se treatment, not rule of reason analysis. 
42. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
43. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
44. /d. at 49 (emphasis added). 
45. 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978). 
46. /d. at 692. 
47. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 n.42 
(1984). 
48. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977). 
49. 472 U.S. 284 (1985). 
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"Unless the [firm] possesses market power or exclusive access to an 
element essential to effective competition, [per se treatment] is not war-
ranted .... Absent such a showing ... courts should apply a rule-of-
reason analysis. "110 
Most recently, the Court stated that "there is a presumption in 
favor of a rule-of-reason standard; that departure from that standard 
must be justified by demonstrable economic effect .... "111 Thus, al-
though there is a presumption of rule of reason treatment for a vertical 
nonprice restraint, such a restraint may be analyzed under the per se 
rule if some economic effect like market power is shown. 
These recent Supreme Court cases stand for the proposition that 
for a plaintiff to get the benefit of per se treatment she must make a 
threshold showing of economic effect. Horizontal and vertical price re-
straints are presumed to have that effect; vertical nonprice restraints, 
however, require an actual showing of economic effect in order to get 
the benefit of per se analysis. If a vertical nonprice restraint plaintiff is 
unable to make that showing, she will then have to settle for rule of 
reason analysis. It would make no sense, however, to also require a 
threshold showing of market power under the rule of reason because 
the inability to show market power is what causes a plaintiff to seek 
rule of reason treatment. 
Tacking on a threshold requirement of showing market power 
under rule of reason results in the vitiation of the rule; the rule be-
comes redundant in that plaintiffs who can show market power will 
always neglect rule of reason in favor of the more preferential per se 
treatment, while plaintiffs who cannot show market power will be pre-
vented from using the rule. As a practical matter, the rule is completely 
eliminated-the very goal of those who recommend the shortcut. 112 The 
Supreme Court, however, has not indicated any willingness to do away 
with the rule of reason. To the contrary, in GTE Sylvania, the Court 
adopted rule of reason treatment for vertical nonprice restraints and 
last term, in Business Electronics, the Court said that "rules in this 
area should be formulated with a view towards protecting the doctrine 
50. !d. at 296-97. See also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
Since the purpose of ... market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the 
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, proof of actual detrimental effects . 
. . can ohviate the need for an inquiry into market power .... [Tjhe finding of actual, 
sustained adverse effects on competition ... is legally sufficient to support a finding 
that the challenged restraint was unreasonable even in the absence of elaborate market 
analysis. 
/d. at 460-61. 
51. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (1988). 
52. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
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of GTE Sylvania. " 53 
Another practical effect of requiring a threshold showing of mar-
ket power is to make it more difficult for private plaintiffs to prove 
their cases. What constitutes a showing of substantial market power is 
far from clear. Is market share alone sufficient? If not, what else is 
required? If market share alone is sufficient, is there a bright line per-
centage? Even if there is a bright line, how do you define the market to 
apply it to? There are no clear answers to these questions. 54 Plaintiffs 
are forced to guess at what constitutes substantial market power. The 
result is to discourage plantiffs and thus discourage private enforcement 
of the antitrust laws. This is in direct contravention of the Clayton 
Act. 55 "Congress created the treble-damage remedy of sec[ tion] 5 pre-
cisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust vio-
lations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the lim-
ited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the 
antitrust laws and deterring violations. "56 
One final problem with the market power approach is that the 
different types of restraints (horizontal, vertical price and vertical non-
price) usually do not fit easily into specific categorization. "The dichot-
omy between the per se and rule of reason categories is far less sharp 
than first appears. " 117 The Court has identified some practices as being 
so heinous that economic effect is just taken for granted. 58 For example, 
per se rules are used without hesitation if a case involves price fixing. 59 
And although the restraint in Assam Drug was a territorial restriction, 
its effects are quite similar to price fixing in that the retailer is re-
stricted to buying from only one distributor, giving that distributor 
complete control of the price. That control resulted in the retailer being 
forced to pay a higher price. Because this effect is so much like a price 
restriction, which would be per se illegal, the operation of the rule of 
reason in this case should yield a similar result. A threshold require-
53. 108 S. Ct. at 1521. 
54. See e.g., Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, 526 F.2d 1196 (9th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 959. One further complication is that the law on market power 
is derived from monopolization cases, not restraint of trade cases. 
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 ( 1982). 
56. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). The legislative history reveals that pri-
vate treble damage actions were conceived primarily as "open[ing] the door ofjustice to every man, 
whenever he may be in jured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ ing] the in jured party 
ample damages for the wrong suffered." 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 ( 1914) (quoted in Brunswick Corp. 
v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)). 
57. P. AREEDA, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: Gt:NERA!. ISSUES 2 
(1981) 
58. United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
59. /d. 
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ment of showing market power which precludes that similar result is 
without merit. Because of this, and especially because it goes against 
the direction the Supreme Court has pointed, the premise that market 
power is a threshold requirement is false. Because this premise fails, 
the Assam Drug court's entire argument also fails. 
IV. SuMMARY juDGMENT 
Nevertheless, even if one grants arguendo that the Assam Drug 
court's premises are true, the argument still fails because its conclusion 
that the market power test applies to antitrust summary judgments does 
not necessarily follow from those premises. 
As discussed above,60 the court adopted the following argument: 
The alleged misconduct involved a vertical nonprice restraint. Such re-
straints are governed by the rule of reason. The rule of reason requires 
a threshold showing of market power. Summary judgment is available 
in antitrust cases. Therefore the market power test applies to summary 
judgment motions in antitrust cases. Assuming that all four premises 
are true, it still does not follow, however, that just because summary 
judgment may be used in antitrust cases, that the market power test is 
an appropriate requirement in motions for summary judgment of anti-
trust cases. 
The reason is that although summary judgment may be used in 
antitrust cases, it can only be used in certain conditions and situations 
outlined in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of 
the way the market power test works, however, it precludes those con-
ditions from ever being present and thus obviates use of the market 
power test in antitrust summary judgment. 
Rule 56 provides in part that a motion for summary judgment: 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.61 
But the Supreme Court has held that at the summary judgment 
stage, the judge is not to weigh the evidence, determine the truth of the 
matter, or even make findings of fact. His only task is to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. This amounts to determining 
whether there are any "genuine factual issues that properly can be re-
solved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved 
60. See supra text following note 34. 
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
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in favor of either party."62 
The market power test is itself a factual issue that is to be resolved 
by the finder of fact. 
This analysis begins by defining the relevant market in which the 
court is to evaluate market power. It then examines the following 
characteristics of the market in which the defendant competes: ( 1) the 
level of concentration in the industry; (2) the extent of product differ-
entiation; and (3) the height of barriers to entry in the market. Fi-
nally, it examines the defendant supplier's position in the market to 
determine whether it is a core member of a tightly-knit oligopoly de-
tected in the previous inquiry or, if no such oligopoly exists, whether 
the defendant possesses substantial market power independently ... 
The courts have declined, however, to establish a bright-line standard 
to indicate how great a supplier's market share must be before the 
restrictions at issue should be considered unreasonable. Although their 
reluctance to promulgate such a standard is certainly due in part to a 
need to preserve flexibility, it also indicates their recognition that 
other factors affect the significance of market share in assessing mar-
ket power. Perhaps most important are the number and size of the 
other firms in the industry. For example, a ten percent market share 
may confer a great deal of power in a severely fragmented industry 
where there are numerous other suppliers, none of which has a mar-
ket share even remotely comparable to that held by the largest firm. 63 
According to Professor Sullivan, a thorough analysis of power in-
volves "intricacies and imponderables."64 Judge Posner says, "Plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant has a large market share-how large is 
unclear." He points out two inherent difficulties. First, "relevant-mar-
ket definition in antitrust cases is uncertain; in many cases a plaintiff 
may be able to persuade the fact finder to define a market in which the 
defendant has a substantial share." Second, "there is no agreement as 
to how great the defendant's market share must be to satisfy the thresh-
old condition of substantial market power."611 
62. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 742, 250 (1986). 
63. Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CAL L. 
REV. 13, 30-35 (1980). 
64. L. SUI.I.IVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 187-88 (1977). 
65. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 6, 16-17 (1981). But see Schwarzer, Making the Rule of Reason 
Analysis More Manageable-Panel Discussion, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 233 (1988): 
.Judge Schwarzer: I think most determinations of what is a relevant market and the 
power of the defendant or defendants within that market are decided on objective eco-
nomic data and what is in dispute is not the economic data, not the evidence, but the 
conclusions that are drawn from it. So, I think that in many cases it is susceptible to 
decision on summary judgment; it is not a jury question at all. 
Jd. at 234. 
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The basic problem with the market power test is the identification 
of market share with market power. Although market share is some-
what easily measured, it does not always give an accurate indication of 
what actual market power is. 
Market share alone in the beer industry does not reflect the potential 
for anticompetitive results .... For example, in the beer market one 
of the competitive characteristics is the high cost of entry into the 
market. Barriers to entry are a significant factor in a participant's 
power to exert an anticompetitive effect .... Since relatively few 
firms share a large percentage of the beer market, high barriers to 
entry can magnify the effects of industry-wide vertical agreements, 
such as the agreements at issue in this case. For this reason alone, the 
market shares of the individual brewers should not be a basis on 
which we grant summary judgment. ... Market share as a threshold 
question is not determinative of market power.66 
The Assam Drug court, however, seems to ignore this fact. It 
states that in order to establish market power, "the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant has a dominant market share in a well-defined rele-
vant market."67 But, as the case cited by the court goes on to state, 
"[ t ]he relevant product and geographic market is a question of fact ... 
. "
68 Thus the market power test, because it creates a genuine issue of 
material fact is not appropriate in motions for summary judgment. 
V. PoLicY 
The Assam Drug court adopted the market power shortcut in or-
der to narrow the "unlimited inquiry necessary under the rule of rea-
son."69 This quest for simplification, however, cannot override the 
guidelines from the Supreme Court. The imposition of a market power 
test as a threshold requirement for summary judgment of cases involv-
ing vertical nonprice restraints is a clear deviation from the direction 
established by the Court. Such an action by an inferior court is a seri-
ous error. 
Another serious error, and one for concern, is the Assam Drug 
court's submission to the siren song of the philosophy of economic effi-
ciency. The version of this philosophy adopted by the court is that 
promulgated by Judge Bork and Judge Posner.70 By rejecting prece-
66. State of New York ex rei. Abrams v. Annheuser-Busch, Inc., 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
11 67,777. 
67. Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d at 318 (8th Cir. 1986). 
68. Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. ltek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1569 (1983). 
69. 798 F.2d at 315-16. 
70. !d. at 316. 
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dent and substituting for it the position espoused by a particular philos-
ophy, the court is, in effect, substituting its own values for those of 
society. Interestingly, the court questions the legitimacy of such a move, 
but is not dissuaded. 71 The problem, however, is not so much judicial 
activism as it is what the activism is attempting to attain: the philoso-
phy of economic efficiency. 
There are a number of problems with this philosophy's approach 
to jurisprudence and there is a substantial body of literature dealing 
with those problems.72 The most common criticism of the philosophy is 
its reduction of humanity to mere elements of equations.73 As a result 
of this reduction the unjust treatment of some members of society is not 
only ignored, but is legitimated.74 "[A]dvocacy of law and economics 
signals a preference for the established order and an ungenerosity to-
ward those outside of the circle of advantage and power."7~ This cer-
tainly holds true in the antitrust context. Given the not-so-rare scenario 
of a plaintiff with limited resources attempting to pursue a claim 
against a powerful defendant, the antitrust positions advocated by the 
philosophy of economic efficiency (e.g. the market power requirement) 
tend to disadvantage plaintiffs-those who are often outside the circle 
of privilege. 
Moreover, market efficiency is only one of the goals of the anti-
trust laws. 
Antitrust should serve consumers' interests and should also serve 
other, established, non-conflicting objectives. There are four major 
historical goals of antitrust, and all should continue to be respected. 
These are: (1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and oppor-
tunity to compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) 
protection of the competition process as market governor.76 
In addition to historical goals, there are also political goals. 
[It] is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political 
values in interpreting the antitrust laws. By 'political values', I mean, 
71. /d. at 316 n.15. 
72. See e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293, 347 (1984); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). 
73. In an extreme example involving teenage runaways forced into prostitution, Kelman 
points out that under this way of thinking "[t]he 'transactions' between hooker and john are pre-
sumably 'value-maximizing.' The price the john is willing to pay presumably compensates the 
hooker for whatever disutility she experiences." Kelman, supra note 72 at 347. 
74. /d. 
75. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a 
Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 588 (1986). 
76. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CoRNF.LL L. RF.v. 1140, 
1182 (1981). 
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first, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power will breed 
antidemocratic political pressures, and second, a desire to enhance in-
dividual and business freedom by reducing the range within which 
private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the wel-
fare of all. A third and overriding political concern is that if the free-
market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under antitrust 
rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result will 
be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be 
impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic 
affairs.77 
The Supreme Court has also noted that economic efficiency is not 
the only goal of the antitrust laws. Justice White points out that an-
other goal is "freedom of the businessman to dispose of his own goods 
as he sees fit .... "78 Another goal was enunciated by Chief Justice 
Warren in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States:79 
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we can-
not fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through 
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress ap-
preciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these 
competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give 
effect to that decision. 80 
The adoption of the market power test as a preliminary require-
ment rejects all of these other goals in favor of economic efficiency. In-
credibly enough, the philosophy of economic efficiency had not even 
been developed yet in the early part of this century when the Sherman 
Act was legislated.81 It is, therefore, hard to see how it could be the sole 
goal of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, because the philosophy tends to 
be at odds with many of the values our society cherishes, it should be 
the last thing we adopt as a purpose of antitrust law; we certainly 
should not adopt it as the purpose of the antitrust laws. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
Showing market power as a threshold requirement for rule of rea-
son analysis is a minority position at odds with the spirit of Supreme 
77. Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979). 
78. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67 (1977) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
79. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
80. !d. at 344. 
81. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Economic efficiency was 
first used in antitrust analysis in the 1950's. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. 
L. REV. 925 (1979). 
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Court case law and many commentators. It is also inappropriate for use 
in summary judgment because it is so fact-intensive. More importantly, 
however, it forecloses the antitrust laws from operating to fulfill their 
many purposes. Because of these reasons Assam Drug Co. v. Miller 
Brewing Co. should not be used by other courts as precedent and the 
requirement of an initial showing by plaintiffs of a defendant's market 
power should be struck down by the Supreme Court. 
Brian L. Dew 
